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Music as knowledge 
The very notion of artistic research suggests that some form of new knowledge might 
spring from such an activity. Before confronting the thornier question of specifically 
musical knowledge, we must at least consider that such an idea presupposes the broader 
possibility of cultural knowledge: the understanding or potential for transformation—
shared or individual, lasting or temporary—that is a response to cultural activity. We might 
even suggest that the generation of such knowledge is the function (or evidence) of cultural 
behaviour. The activity of musicians, then, is to engage on some level with the production 
of cultural knowledge. Irreducible to epistêmê or technê, cultural knowledge requires a 
context, some degree of common experience, however tacit or individually interpreted, if it 
is to enter the stream of cultural consciousness. “Research” suggests reflection—the search 
for knowledge rather than its incidental generation. The knowledge production inherent in 
reflective musical practices becomes and needs to become more explicit at certain moments 
of cultural evolution—and I suggest that the present is such a moment. This emerging-into-
discourse entails some kind of bidirectional mapping or projection as part of such a 
mediated percolation of ideas—hence the naturally multidisciplinary nature of artistic 
research. Our technology-informed moment is also particular in this respect: the mapping, 
transposition, and re-representation of structures, data, or concepts is a key operator of 
contemporary culture. 
 Reflective musicians find themselves surrounded by a universal culture—allowing 
for historical extinction and geographical ignorance—with which they have to form some 
kind of relationship, and yet any knowledge they make of it must be grounded in their own 
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time and place. Following Giorgio Agamben and Alain Badiou, I suggest that we inhabit a 
cultural environment of fragmentation, a glorious but potentially disempowered 
kaleidoscope of overlapping interests, tastes, and traditions in which both the academy and 
the state have withdrawn from judgements of intrinsic value and criticism is impoverished. 
The common connoisseurship on which the concept of canon is predicated is clearly no 
longer a viable concept. Identities—interests, pursuits, allegiances, and understandings—
are individual, complex, overlapping, and dynamic.1 My contention is that the production 
of knowledge is the natural work of music—or, less ambitiously, of Western art music—
and that in this present environment the work of musicians must be to address its need for a 
context, however local, in which to emerge. 
 This knowledge is generated and shared within a wider cultural economy that the 
musician has to navigate ever more consciously; the artist becomes a self-defining node in 
multiple, dynamic networks. This chapter therefore takes an analogous approach, 
triangulating the position of the reflective musician from several perspectives: 
contemporary creative practice in its professional and technological environments, changes 
in cultural and academic structures, the evolving role of musicians and understandings of 
the nature of knowledge. Artistic research, it suggests, is the appropriate response of 
musicians to a world that while purporting to respect difference also fosters fragmentation. 
As a common undertaking, it constitutes a new and potent form of assembly.2 
 
Musical practices and the production of knowledge 
Practice—continuity and present 
Practice is an individual, embodied, situated, consistent process that has continuity 
independent of a particular manifestation, an adaptability to materials, brief, and context, 
and a capacity to co-evolve with them. It is the behaviour of homo faber, “a point of view” 
rather than repetition, as McCullough (1996, 246) suggests. This implies a degree of 
autonomy and reflective self-knowledge; to extend the computational metaphor we might 
imagine an individual practice as a virtual model of potential behaviour, managed, 																																																								
1 This idea is expanded in Malouf (2000). 
2 Butler’s “performative theory of assembly” could usefully be explored in this context: “resistance has to be 
plural and it has to be embodied” (Butler 2015, 217). 
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maintained, and observed through its various interactions.3 The practitioner maintains and 
manages a more-or-less conscious or detailed image of his or her practice that is to a degree 
autonomous of both his or her own moment-to-moment state and of any particular material 
or object, is adaptive and evolving, in which the practitioner can intervene and on which he 
or she can reflect. To allow for the possible near-identity of practice and object, let us refer 
to an instantiation. The space, however slight, between practice and instantiation, however 
virtual, is the locus of first-stage reflection.  
 While their contextual regimes and modes of output may vary, the imagining of 
past, distant, or future worlds are not qualitatively different practices in this respect. 
Improvisation, historically informed performance, composition, and musicology can be 
regarded as commensurable; they are acts of imagination instantiated in a shared present. 
Whatever their apparent material or mode of output, their truth will be tested in that same 
present. They have access to the same repertory of conceptual models—that of their own 
moment—which they seek to extend by acts of imagination; research is a practice just as 
practice may be research. I will propose that in order not to resign music to infinite 
difference and fragmentation, reflective practice must remain aware of its role in 
encouraging the emergence of knowledge structures that may have relevance beyond the 
immediate scope of a particular situation. To this end, two requirements present 
themselves: an ethical approach to individual projects, and wider-ranging study of the 
epistemology of music and its dynamics in a global culture. 
 
Economies of knowledge 
Musicians participate in an economy of knowledge, therefore. Like any economy in a phase 
of perceived instability, speculation, black markets, and forgeries will be rife; the self-
preserving dynamics of the economy itself would tend to dominate over the interests of the 
society it serves. The economy of cultural knowledge is just as subject to these pressures as 
that of culture itself. Making reflective practice look like research as recognised in other 
fields becomes an exercise in its own right; musical knowledge has to take non-musical 																																																								
3 I have suggested elsewhere that the interactive computer-embodied work constitutes an appropriate 
paradigm for contemporary practice (Impett 2011). McCullough (1996) shows how contemporary digital 
practices are contiguous with more physical manifestations. 
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forms. Flights of taste, fiction, and virtuosity are validated by context and costume; their 
cloaking in the white coat of science does not free them from assumption, agenda, and 
display. Peer review and funding body appraisal are tests of process, not knowledge. At the 
same time, our wider understanding of how knowledge is constituted is evolving to 
incorporate aspects of musical experience. Notions such as “embodied” or “enacted” 
knowledge suggest—to draw a musical parallel—that what we think of as propositional 
knowledge is a particular and useful case within a broader spectrum of human knowledge, 
just as the work-(almost)-as-text is a particular and remarkable instance of human music-
making. 
 
The work of music 
The modernist obligation 
The development of practice as a potential research activity needs to be considered from the 
perspective of practitioners, of musicians. The work of musicians is structured socially; that 
is, musicians work together (even if—as in the artificial limit case of the ivory-tower 
composer—some of that contact may be conceptual rather than material, and transposed in 
time) and in some kind of cultural context. These social and working structures are 
intimately linked with the production of cultural knowledge. It is interesting to trace the 
development of the perceived responsibility of musicians to produce new knowledge. At 
certain points in the humanist–enlightenment–modernist trajectory, some musical 
activity—particularly theory-informed composition—has been implicitly understood as 
research. At the end of the sixteenth century Zarlino may have been a conservative, but was 
so precisely because his view of the past was one of continual progression. In the preface to 
the last great manual of Western common practice, the Harmonielehre, Schönberg (1922, 
v–viii) passes to students the obligation to see beyond their teachers. That musical activity 
has the obligation to modify itself according to ceaseless self-criticism is an ideological 
modernism that persists, even if its statements are local, contextual, or relational. In this 
respect, we might see Western science itself as a modernist project and the adoption of 
notions of research in the arts as a way of maintaining the modernist credentials of Western 
artistic practices when style is no longer a marker. From Zarlino to Xenakis, accounts of 
musical practice in a particular present locate themselves historically; they ground 
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themselves in an unhearable past and seek to address an unknowable future. As our 
relationship with musics of other times and places has expanded, so has the potential 
territory of the reflective musician, of musica speculativa. For Zarlino, musica speculativa 
and musica prattica were indivisible.4 For his near-contemporary Banchieri (1601, A3r), 
human frailty makes their combination rare and sometimes superficial. Banchieri was not 
only a great musical humorist but also a pragmatist. As we shall suggest, pragmatism can 
not only hide laziness of thought or lack of vision, it can also be an instrument for the 
repression of ideas, for the impeding of cultural evolution. In this respect, Banchieri 
represents our challenge. 
 
Roles and identity 
Through most of the twentieth century, musicians were able to make productivity-
enhancing assumptions about their context. Much musical development was predicated on a 
relatively stable cultural context: a balance of the infrastructure of musical life, state 
support (directly, through broadcasters or education), the recording industry, and an 
effective cross-subsidy with the commercial music industry. Simplistically put, the role of 
their work required little explanation to its immediate constituencies; the historical 
continuity of cultural structures validated their associated practices. 
 Through the second half of the twentieth century, musical practices became more 
explicitly reflective. Developments such as those of historically informed performance and 
the emergence of an understanding of composition as inherently an activity of research—
investigating technical, technological, cultural, and cognitive challenges and possibilities—
could be seen as contiguous with historical modernism. They are parallel manifestations of 
an underlying current (see, e.g., Adorno 2002; Harnoncourt 2005). During the same period 
a social, global view of music-making has led to an understanding of music as a universal 
human behaviour rather than a particular set of texts or conventions (Blacking 1974; Ingold 
2007; Small 1998), while an individual, cognitive view has led to an understanding of the 
common mechanisms of its embodiment (see, e.g., Levitin 2007; Hallam, Cross, and Thaut 
2009). 
																																																								
4 Zacconi ([1622] 1983) expands on the relationship at greater length.  
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 Over recent decades the cultural roles of musicians and their activities have become 
less clear than previously; no less important—indeed probably yet more urgent—but more 
complex, more conditional or contingent. Many factors have contributed to this, but we 
might identify a recoiling from elitism, the questioning of a canon and a reticence to judge 
value or importance, the dissolving of the remnant behaviours of high bourgeois culture, 
and the impact of cultural relativism on Western art music. Crucially, the stability of 
cultural context is eroded even where there would appear to be continuity of structure: the 
concert hall, the opera house, the broadcaster. Contexts for meaning, for the production of 
knowledge, are open to renegotiation in each instance. Apparent stability preserved the 
integrity and distinctiveness of professional roles and categories: performer/composer, 
art/commercial music, live/recorded, academic/practitioner. Cultural and technological 
evolution has illuminated the artificiality of such distinctions, dissolving both barriers and 
supports. Anyone professing music—rather than having a circumstantial relationship with a 
particular practice—is obliged to construct their own set of relationships. As in other fields, 
material and knowledge economies are increasingly intertwined on a personal level. The 
reflective practitioner constructs and navigates a unique network of musical languages, 
cultural discourses, and social structures. Musicians now have to reflect more consciously 
on their places, roles, the nature of their musical activities, and their relationships with 
musics and practices from many other times and places, as well as the sources and 
rationales for their incomes. Once seemingly the preserve of visionary composers, 
performers and critics, a critical stance is now a common property of musicians. They are 
obliged to situate themselves as a node in multiple musical, discursive, and economic 
networks. 
 
Tasks and truth 
The task of the musician thus becomes to bring this musical activity into a shared present, 
to identify and cultivate a context local to the event in which new knowledge might emerge. 
Musical knowledge, in this sense, is not a “knowing that” accessible to formal logic, nor is 
it mystical or transcendental, but rather material understanding that takes place in the 
musical domain. Badiou suggests that we should acknowledge the distinction between 
different modes of knowledge and the limits on their remapping or translation. In his search 
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for a path forwards based on events of common understanding rather than infinite 
difference, Badiou proposes an ethic of truths. A truth, Badiou (2001) suggests, “proceeds 
in the situation” (42), it is an event in addition to “what there is” (41); “To enter into the 
composition of a subject of truth can only be something that happens to you” (51). “Rather 
than link [ethics] to abstract categories . . . it should be referred back to particular 
situations” (3). A truth not only is situated and personal but also requires “eventual fidelity” 
of the subject. For Deleuze and Guattari (1988, 316), the artist may be “the first person to 
set out a boundary stone, or to make a mark,” but such marks are made individually; their 
cultural effects are subsequent emergent structures. The sharing of a truth is thus a vital part 
of its status as truth. According to Badiou, there are different kinds of truth—those of 
science, politics, love, and art—between which there may be analogies or associations but 
not translations. I would propose that we add musical truth to this list (this is not the place 
to debate what other distinctions might be introduced), and that to demystify music, to 
relieve it of its historically inherited burden of the sublime, we count musical truths as 
instances of musical knowledge. 
 Following Badiou, we might tentatively propose some maxims concerning musical 
knowledge: 
All musical knowledge is generated in a present (whenever the music was created). 
All reflective engagement with music is creative (whatever form it takes). 
Musical knowledge is both embodied and distributed through culture and technology. 
The primary mode of musical knowledge is musical. 
 
The environment for artistic research 
Structures and values 
Changes in the roles of musicians have been driven by external circumstances as much as 
aesthetic vision. The sources of funding for music—commercial, in cultural life, and in 
education—are not only reduced, their criteria have changed radically over two 
generations. Globalisation and the drive to productivity have transformed the work of 
musicians in ways not dissimilar to other forms of production. The identification of and 
adaptability to new constituencies, flexibility of production, quantifiability and 
accountability, and the explicit addressing of broader external concerns and constraints 
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have all become as important for the practice of musicians as in the conduct of business. 
These inform musicological insight and experiment as much as brilliance of performance, 
compositional inventiveness, technological innovation, or cultural planning. Funding comes 
from the market—which depends on celebrity, feeding established taste, or confirming 
established knowledge—or from funding organisations whose decisions are informed by 
parameters such as those of the UK government’s Green Book guidelines on appraisal and 
evaluation (HM Treasury 2003). The notion of “willingness to pay”—the degree to which 
society is willing explicitly to channel resources—is as unavoidable for the practice of 
music as for every other area. In all cases this is a withdrawal from musical value 
judgement, such that musicians must cultivate second-order parameters in order to do their 
work. The “evidence” for musical knowledge requires extra-musical mediation; the 
methodologies of other disciplines or representations in other media are unavoidable. While 
artistic research distinguishes itself from less contextualising artistic development, this new 
context might be seen as a way for society to support wider cultural evolution on the basis 
of shared relevance rather than taste or market. 
 
Transposition and transdisciplinarity 
Thus the apparent making explicit of knowledge produced through musical activity is in 
every case a mapping to knowledge of a different kind. It becomes transposable, separated 
from its shared present, but by the same token affords shared reflection and is subject to 
examination. Most importantly, in this dehydrated, pasteurised form it can become an 
ingredient in the production of musical knowledge in another context. Thus mediated, it can 
become part of a wider discourse, subject to open reflection and investigation, and inform 
other modes of practice and understanding. In every case, an extramusical state mediates 
between instances of musical knowledge. This does not mean that musical knowledge 
becomes propositional knowledge. Rather, each remapping, each bringing-to-discourse, 
contributes to a broader cultural dynamic within which the potential for musical knowledge 
evolves. 
 
Navigating the landscape 
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For artist-researchers the landscape may be wider and more accessible, but it is also more 
complicated to navigate. This is the state of there being no “outside” described by Negri 
(2011, 108): “Both from the intensive and from the extensive point of view, the artistic 
paradox consists today in the wish to produce the world (bodies, movements) differently—
and yet from within a world which admits of no other world other than the one which 
actually exists, and which knows that the ‘outside’ to be constructed can only be the other 
within an absolute insidedness.” 
 Negri’s summary recalls Badiou’s analysis: a series of infinite difference attempts 
to build relationships with a world of increasing homogeneity. Ultimately, Negri is unlikely 
to be entirely correct: future agenda-serving reductive narratives will identify various 
“outsides.” What is more likely is that the density of cultural interconnectedness occludes 
such edges. The extent of a boundaryless field of potential activity is vertiginous. At the 
same time, the constraints of well-formed research encourage solipsism: self-reference 
between work and mapping, between analysis and discourse, methodology or discipline.5 
This informs the role of the creating-researching subject; he or she has a perceived 
obligation to avoid “outsides,” but in the process such elements go to ground, bury 
themselves in discourse and assumption—the fuel of deconstruction. We might reframe the 
issue thus: reflective musicians have to establish clear critical distance with their work 
without either compromising their personal investments or constructing artificial conceits. 
Lyotard (1997, 235) takes a broader view: “The West is that civilization that questions its 
essence as civilization. The singularity of Western civilization resides in this questioning, 
which in return endows it with a universal import—or so it claims.” As production and 
reflection both proliferate and fragment, they need to become more closely related in order 
to maintain this crucial relationship between creation, re-creation or interpretation, and self-
questioning. Ultimately this resides in the practice–research nexus. Critical, aesthetic, and 
																																																								
5 There is another important avenue to be pursued here. We might see the apparent common sense and 
reasonableness of the anglophone, Anglo-Saxon discourse within which the notion of practice-as-research has 
evolved—perhaps as much to explicitly attach research to its object as to intellectually validate practice, as 
both seek new rationales within vertiginous cultural change—as a rhetorical device, a sophistry designed to 
repress and dismiss creative thought and progress. Its very apparent pragmatism may be what makes it 
slippery. I would not presume to develop such an argument in a context such as this. 
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technical discourse cannot form any kind of unitary relationship with the whole range of 
musical activity that constitutes our cultural world; their ties with practice have to be closer 
and relate to a specific locus of thought or action. Musica teorica can no longer offer truths 
without reference to musica prattica. The challenge is then to avoid a collection of 
mutually validating pairs, connected only by methodological analogy, and instead to 
encourage and observe the emergence of broader structures of musical meta-knowledge 
with their own dynamics. 
 
Knowledge and interface 
As Bourdieu ([1983] 1993, 35) has pointed out, “The production of discourse . . . about the 
work of art is one of the conditions of production of the work.” Without this, art becomes 
“derealised,” separated from any system within which it produces knowledge. Rancière 
describes the embedding context—discourse, value systems, cultural structures—as a 
regime (see, e.g., Rancière 2013). In the absence of a single clear regime, art must bring 
with it the conditions for constructing its own. The musician-researcher seeks to build an 
interface integral to each instance of musical knowledge, one that will connect not only 
with other subjects but also with other interfaces. The output of musical artistic research is 
an interface—the paradigmatic artefact of our time, as Herbert Simon (1996, 6) observed—
that relates an inner environment to an outer environment. 
 
The nature of practice-research: craft and knowledge-production 
Modes of production 
Negri considers the nature of work in general in this new space. Artistic activity always 
reflects the modes of production within which it takes place and of which it is an instance. 
He describes labour as becoming more immaterial and cognitive. Labour and artistic 
production become each other’s subject, he says. “Their subject and object refer to each 
other, in a game which is precisely that of production, and in which there is no longer an 
‘outside’” (Negri 2011, 113). Intelligence, technique, and labour enter a new relationship, a 
view echoing interpretations of Marx’s Praxis (see, e.g., Bernstein 1971). Negri (2011, 
110) describes this as a Kunstwollen, the desire to make art that is “an intentionality that 
renews its own epoch.” The work of art exists within its contemporary mode of production; 
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it is both commodity and activity. This is as true for an essay or a performance as a 
composition; we have established above that contemporary creative practice in its widest 
form encompasses the past, the distant, and the future. The present is as specious in art as in 
mind. Negri develops an idea of communication as an integral element of contemporary 
labour. Communicating the imaginary and real spaces that their work inhabits is thus 
integral to the work of creative practitioners. As Negri points out, however, the components 
of a networked world are not ineffable; the networks are real and technological, and at their 
nodes are communities of people who have established some shared concern. In the 
absence of an “outside” the creative act exists as an event, a singularity. If knowledge is to 
develop broader momentum, the practitioner must connect to an outside and demonstrate 
their contiguity with other productive and receptive practices. This “moment of the 
recognition of the common” forms part of Negri’s (2011, 121) vision of contemporary 
artistic practice. 
 
Present contexts for production 
Let us artificially distinguish these two modes of production—musical knowledge specific 
to musical experience and more transposable, transportable cultural knowledge—that in the 
case of artistic research are the result of the same activity. They act within a single habitus; 
Bourdieu’s (1990, 53) comprehensive explication of his term uses an appropriately musical 
metaphor: 
 
The conditionings associated with a particular class of conditions of existence produce 
habitus, systems of durable, transposable dispositions, structured structures predisposed to 
function as structuring structures, that is, as principles which generate and organize 
practices and representations that can be objectively adapted to their outcomes without 
presupposing a conscious aiming at ends or an express mastery of the operations necessary 
in order to attain them. Objectively “regulated” and “regular” without being in any way the 
product of obedience to rules, they can be collectively orchestrated without being the 
product of the organizing action of a conductor. 
 
 We are seeking through practices to refine our sense of our own habitus—to 
understand our world and to enable music to play its part. To this end practices must reflect 
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on how they relate to one another, how they constitute an authentic common habitus. Both 
musical and broader cultural modes of knowledge production inhabit a compound 
contemporary discourse defined by more or less informal discourses such as critical theory, 
media theory, technology, cognition, histories, and cultural relativism. The patterns and 
dynamics of the distribution of knowledge are what distinguish our broader embedding 
discourse from those of other times (the rhetoric, theology, and counterpoint of Bach; the 
revolution, aesthetics, and tonal perspective of Beethoven). In our contemporary case it 
leads to a close relationship between creative and research activities. In terms of the present 
topic, we might see a networked world as constituted of knots of the work of cultural 
knowledge production and musical knowledge production, inseparable for reasons we shall 
pursue below.  
 Their common work within a technologised, networked environment suggests a 
notion of craft, which resurfaces more strongly now than at any point since the nineteenth-
century bifurcation of culture into industrialised, commodified production on the one hand 
and the work of genius on the other. Craft—whether of creation, invention, analysis, 
criticism, or interpretation—implies a degree of continuity, of rehearsal, of shared practice 
irreducible to a set of rules. The notion of craft suggests an adaptive, evolving set of 
heuristics and experience, tools and models, responsive to materials and project while 
guarding against the arbitrary interventions of taste. It also suggests that knowledge might 
emerge from the relationship between craftsperson, tools, techniques, materials and 
context; that through practice new knowledge might emerge that was inaccessible to 
conscious reflection prior to the process. Ingold (2011, 53) refers to “the processional 
quality of tool use” in the practice of skill; in this respect, theoretical, technical, and 
generative models are tools as much as are a hammer or a clarinet. Informal, unreflected 
models are as significant as theory or technique, and their study is a key element of artistic 
research. Technology provides the common medium for these practices, however 
transparently. We return to remapping, the transferring of information from one domain or 
mode of perception to another, as a key characteristic of an informational world, one that 
distinguishes it from other cultural moments. Paradigms and practices have evolved within 
this world that have become our natural frameworks for the production of knowledge. 
McCullough (1996) describes the emergence of digital craft within the adaptive symbolic 
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environments of new technologies as “dense notational contexts for action” (99) and shows 
how new shapes of community develop through the distribution of digital craft (252). 
 
Present knowledge 
This same technological environment restores the potential for presence to the instantiation 
and distribution of musical and cultural knowledge. Technology can be used to generate a 
sense of immediacy, situatedness, and responsiveness in music-making, when even live 
performance of “classical” music can seem an act of commodified reproduction. In 
interactive technological environments, for example, we can situate complex and 
contingent musical events and experiment with ways of mapping the notational or symbolic 
back to musical reality. As Vattimo has pointed out, the virtual provides a path to a new 
real, “a deep and unprecedented transformation of the very ‘principle of reality’” (Vattimo 
2005), whereas what he perceives as a current call for evidence-based “reality” is an 
instrument of conformism, of confining knowledge to barracks (Vattimo 2012). The 
conditions of what Lyotard (1991, 50) calls a “telegraphic art”—art at a distance in time 
and space—allow for the distribution of a shared present across place and at different 
moments. This has implications for common aesthetic experience and for the development 
of knowledge, which we will consider below. What concern us here are two 
complementary properties of this environment: that it allows the emergence of 
communities, however temporary, that are geographically fragmented; and that the event or 
knowledge can be instantiated dynamically, adaptively, in response to local conditions. 
Above, we discussed the role of acts of imagination in reflective creative practice. The 
general state of contemporary knowledge is that produced by simulation, whether in acts of 
imagination or through technology. That is, a knowledge event can be considered to be 
such when it can be shared—reinstantiated in another mind or system, a process that 
requires some degree of local reconfiguring. DeLanda (2011, 18) suggests that we consider 
singularities of such knowledge in terms of the “spaces of possibility” that they define; the 
stability of emergent properties is in the fact that their possibility spaces share the same 
structure. Concepts from a technological world thus suggest mechanisms for the 
communication, sharing, or “outside world” imperatives identified above. 
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The present space 
Technological music and sound art, reflecting as they do the modes of production of our 
time, can clearly be understood in these terms. But what of other forms of musical practice 
and research? What of the performance and understanding of earlier music, for example? 
We return to the principle above: all musical knowledge occurs in a present. Specialisation 
in various self-defining areas of cultural knowledge militates against acknowledgement of 
this fundamental idea. It is important to regard the full extent of this activity as a single 
“field” (Bourdieu’s term is perhaps the least contentious): “. . . a field of forces, but . . . also 
a field of struggles . . .” (Bourdieu [1983] 1993, 30). Such a field doubtless embodies 
internal articulation and asymmetries, but, if we are to investigate the dynamics of musical 
knowledge, it must be considered as a whole. The science-derived metaphor of DeLanda is 
anticipated by the analysis of Bourdieu, who describes acts within a field as “position-
taking . . . defined in relation to the space of possibles” (ibid.). 
 
Practice and theory 
Different modes of knowledge become homologous when they are effectively the same 
activity; the mapping almost becomes commutable. Barthes’s writing a novel in the course 
of his lectures at the Collège de France might be an example (Barthes 2011). When both 
derive from words this situation is more conceivable; Cage’s lectures on music perhaps 
come closest—the late How to Get Started, for instance, which we can still hear (see Cage 
2010). In the same context, visual artist Anselm Kiefer (2011) considered taking a similar 
approach to Barthes. Ultimately he was thwarted, but this very non-identity led him to 
consider the relationship between practice and public reflection. Two important points 
emerge. First, that practice and theory are not always in the same phase relationship. There 
are instances when the possibility of knowledge through practice is predicated on the 
dissemination of theory; Kiefer cites certain aspects of mediaeval religious painting as 
relying on prior knowledge to do their work as art, for example. Second, while we can 
consider scientific knowledge to be cumulative, to progress unidirectionally, this is not the 
case for the knowledge produced through art. We might understand the consequences of 
these ideas in terms of a historical materialist perspective: given the complex cultural 
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context, it may be necessary for theory to precede practice in a constellation of loci in order 
for artistic knowledge to continue to do its consciousness-expanding work. 
 
An ethics for practice-research in music 
Art and fragmentation 
Both Badiou and Agamben look at the paradox of the seemingly reduced power of art in a 
culture that has seen it liberated and proliferate to the point of ubiquity. The mystery they 
address can be paraphrased thus: if the potential power of art was so clear to Plato that the 
role of the artist had to be clearly circumscribed for the sake of society, why with our 
apparent freedoms is it now so peripheral to human behaviour? If there is such a diversity 
of free creative thought in contemporary art, why are alternative voices less instrumental 
than ever in economics and politics? Badiou and Agamben both see fragmentation as the 
challenge. In their view, society is encouraged to see acts of creation and imagination—
potential cultural knowledge, including musical knowledge—as singularities, as elements 
in a succession of difference. This militates against the emergence of wider, new, shared 
understanding and protects the status quo. Badiou views this as an instrument of power and 
repression, Agamben as a stage of cultural evolution. 
 For Badiou, the problem is a culture predicated on difference, a faux respect for the 
individual that prevents the emergence of consensus structures—the democratic deficit 
identified by Hardt and Negri (2005). The potentially common search for understanding 
through art is so individualised, so dissipated that it loses all its potential social energy. 
Badiou (2006, 148) puts forward an alternative programme, an affirmative aesthetics that 
proceeds from the artist’s responsibility to seek truths based on commonality. Agamben 
(1999a) sets out from a different perspective. He considers the nature of the work and the 
task of the artist, and finds “the end of the poem” inevitable; the creative work as 
previously construed is no longer possible. However, in acknowledging this, the artist 
becomes “a man without content.” The artist serves in his or her work to give form to the 
common contemporary experience of confronting the silence as a space of potential 
(Agamben 1999a, 65; 1999b). The very striving to create or grasp new cultural knowledge 
is the common human experience upon which new kinds of shared knowledge might be 
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predicated. Such a view is clearly rooted in a Gramscian consciousness-raising 
interpretation of culture, but how do subjective truths relate to wider consciousness? 
 
Cultural emergence 
Artistic research focuses—quite appropriately—on the specifics of an instance. Whether 
inventing anew or attempting to understand and bring to life from afar, the seeking after 
musical knowledge involves some kind of transformation of the individual through 
immersion in and rehearsal of mental and physical processes that have been imagined but 
not yet fully realised. Analogously, critical theory tends to concentrate on the individual 
subject, work, or relationship. Such focus militates against cultural evolution unless a plane 
exists on which cultural emergence can take place. We should therefore pay attention to 
ways in which to encourage the emergence of broader knowledge patterns from the close, 
reflective, contextualising relationship of practice and research. Indeed, we might see this 
as the responsibility of each individual project. The study of the dynamics of musical meta-
knowledge, of which the present book is an example, is vital. To paraphrase Franco Moretti 
(2013), the reflective, detailed close listening of artistic research needs to be balanced by 
“distant listening.” 
 Badiou (2001, 44–45) addresses this need on the basis of ethics, in terms that reflect 
both this crucial relationship between personal, embodied, lived experience and wider 
cultural consciousness: 	What	I	will	call,	in	general,	the	“ethic	of	a	truth”	is	the	principle	that	enables	the	continuation	of	a	truth-process—or,	to	be	more	precise	and	complex,	that	which	lends	
consistency	to	the	presence	of	some-one	in	the	composition	of	the	subject	induced	by	the	
process	of	this	truth.	.	.	.	The	“some-one”	thus	caught	up	.	.	.	is	simultaneously	himself	.	.	.	and	in	excess	of	himself,	because	the	uncertain	course	of	fidelity	passes	through	him,	transfixes	his	singular	body	and	inscribes	him,	from	within	time,	in	an	instant	of	eternity.	
 
 Negri (2011, 117) arrives at an analogous formulation: 
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we have to specify the multitudinarian event [the product of contemporary “cognitive 
labour”] as an excedence [a surplus] which opens to the common. . . . All production is 
consequently an event of communication; and the common is achieved through 
multitudinarian events. And this is how it comes about, this capacity to renew the 
mechanisms of knowledge and action which—today, in the epoch of cognitive labour—we 
call artistic.6 
 
 Despite complexities of language, both writers are showing how a truth-event based 
on sameness can derive from a singular event characterised by difference. If a singular 
event is to be shared in a way sufficiently analogous that it can become part of a wider 
cultural-musical discourse, such a mechanism is vital—the interface mentioned above. The 
knowledge must embody the means of its own communication. This duality is at the heart 
of the activity of practice-as-research; exposing the commonality of individual events of 
musical knowledge is one of its responsibilities. The work of artistic research is not only to 
explore new spaces but also to construct appropriate interfaces. According to David 
Couzens Hoy, critical theory converges on an ethics precisely in its duty to maintain a 
resistant potential. Developing ideas from Levinas and Derrida, Hoy (2004, 182) sees a 
form of ethical resistance “as the resistance of the completely powerless.” He explores an 
analogous paradox at the heart of ethics: the potential contradiction between ethical 
responsibilities towards the one and towards the whole. It is only in the close ethical 
relationship between a research activity and the musical truths to which it relates that wider 
knowledge can emerge. The duty of “eventual fidelity” is therefore to a particular path to a 
musical truth (from an observation, a clue or an intuition, whether realised or not, and an 
individual process, a practice) rather than to a discipline, a methodology, or an institution. 
 
Praxis and mimesis 
We might understand the mediating property of this truth relationship as a form of mimesis 
and artistic research as embodying a double bind of poiesis and praxis. Agamben (1999a, 
68–93) traces the relative roles of Aristotelian concepts of poiesis and praxis through the 																																																								
6 The translation is not helpful. The “multitudinarian” addresses the multitude. “Excedence” would appear in 
translations from French as “surplus.” 
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development of Western aesthetics. For him, their relationship was inverted as praxis—
rooted in the condition of “man” as a living being—gained the upper hand in the shape of 
the assertion of will. One might see certain theories of embodiment as continuations of this 
line. Poiesis, by contrast, Agamben (ibid., 73) describes as “a mode of truth . . . of the 
unveiling that produces things from concealment into presence.” This is the opposite of the 
imposition of will. It is inherently a process of research, guided—no less than in the case of 
science—by an unrealised seed of understanding and sought by means of the design and 
application of a process. The difference lies in the mode of knowledge produced; musical 
knowledge has a quasi-quantum nature in that its being experienced and being observed are 
in an inextricable relationship. Its presence is not falsifiable, and it can only be discussed by 
taking the observer, the act of observing, into account. 
 Rancière takes issues with what he sees as Badiou’s and Agamben’s dismissal of 
the relevance of aesthetics. He does so mistakenly, I believe—they are concerned rather 
with re-empowering aesthetic experience—but on this basis he raises some interesting 
arguments. He sees the emergence of a common discourse of aesthetics as the moment 
when the knot of a threefold regime of poiesis, mimesis, and aesthesis—which he describes 
as the representative regime—was untied: “this knot had tied together a productive nature, 
a sensible nature and a legislative nature called mimesis or representation. . . . With this end 
[of mimesis], the muses cede their place to music, that is to a relation without mediation 
between the calculus of the work and the pure sensible affect” (Rancière 2009, 7). 
 Perhaps we could see practice/research as a new form of mimesis, proper to each 
instance; practice as the mediation between calculus and affect. Ethics, says Rancière, is 
“the kind of thinking in which an identity is established between an environment, a way of 
being and a principle of action” (ibid., 110). He warns against the illusory ethical turn of 
aesthetics that polarises consensus art—the product of art’s perceived responsibility to its 
audience (rights to art)—with the avant-garde, which is responsible to bear infinite witness 
to contradictions (rights of art). Here we are rather proposing an ethics of practice—a way 
of being and principle of action—that preserves the nature of musical knowledge, “giving 
back to these inventions their status as cuts that are always ambiguous, precarious, 
litigious” (ibid., 132). This double bind of practice and reflection is acknowledged by 
Agamben (1999a, 61) in his reading of a Platonic view of the aesthetic sphere as “a 
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condition in which manual and intellectual labor are not yet divided”; it occupies a unique 
truth-telling place prior to sophistry or taste. 
 
Emerging discourse 
How might we imagine the structure, the network of practice-research nodes from which 
new patterns might emerge? Individual practices are sustained, constrained, coherent, 
focussed activities. In what way does the knowledge generated through one practice 
materially affect the environment for others? We could see this in terms of a distributed 
frame problem. Wheeler (2005) considers the problem in the context of embodied–
embedded cognitive science—at the heart of the compound contemporary discourse 
described above. He contrasts a Cartesian decontextualised view of an intelligent agent (the 
musician-researcher in this case) with a Heideggerian, context-bound understanding, 
proposing a model of coupled dynamical systems generating evolving behaviour that 
exhibits “multiple interacting factors of various kinds and . . . self-organization” (ibid., 
245–46). New structure—new knowledge—thus contributes materially to the behaviour of 
existing knowledge systems, not just their context or data. This could be criticised as a 
standard strong emergentist view; that is, the behaviour and role of such a meta-system 
depends on the standpoint and agenda of the observer. However, we are considering 
precisely a case wherein each “intelligent agent” is seeking not to identify definitive 
solutions but to evolve his or her own practice. 
 Such a cultural process requires a discourse, a common resource of ideas and 
models. Stengers (2011) considers the repertoire of new concepts that have emerged from 
recent scientific research to inform wider cultural discourse—not only new intellectual 
constructs but also evolving models of thought. They inevitably inform and figure in the 
compound, informal discourse of current humanities research described above. She sees a 
politics of modes and instances of knowledge. Stengers proposes an ecology of such 
models, referring to Latour’s ecological regime that “sorts not so much practices as the 
ways in which those practices are liable to present themselves, to be present for others” 
(ibid., 394). She posits a distinction between blinkered experts and diplomats, the 
negotiators who explore the deterritorialisation of fields and categories. The broader 
cultural assimilation, negotiation, and evolution of new concepts she describes as a 
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“cosmopolitical parliament.” Experts and practitioners have the responsibility to bring their 
new knowledge into this informal public forum, she says, to participate in the debate. 
Crucially, such knowledge is always to be understood as situated in time, “relative to a 
present that new diplomats or experts will bring to pass” (ibid., 396). This situation will 
require of each practice that it participate on the production of meta-knowledge: “The 
cosmopolitical parliament ‘exists’ today occasionally, but precariously and 
improvisationally, without memory and without any long-term consequences, the way a 
microbubble forms in a liquid just below the boiling point. It cannot be stabilized, cannot 
exist, in the ecological sense, without the active, engaged, risk-filled production of practices 
that create knowledge about practices, capable of narrating the way they differ and matter” 
(ibid., 405). 
 
Conclusion 
Perhaps the notion of artistic research should ideally be redundant. It runs the risk of 
reifying the equation as an exception, of validating the non-reflective forms of both 
expressions. Rather, we should encourage musical practices—whatever their mode of 
output—that are reflective, self-aware, that acknowledge their own historical-cultural 
context, and that afford debate and evolution. Practice is a sustained, individual trajectory 
based on knowledge and imagination—whether past, distant, or future—that can lead to the 
instantiation of music knowledge in a shared present. Whatever metaphor we choose as a 
model for this parliament—dynamical system, space of possibilities, potential space—the 
researching agents that constitute it have a triple responsibility: to represent the musical 
knowledge that their practice may (or may not) generate as truthfully as possible as cultural 
knowledge, to do so in a manner that allows it to find commonalities with other practices, 
however unrelated they may appear in their detail, and to participate in the wider common 
project of observing structures emerge through that process. “To discover what is common 
even in what is different,” as Gadamer (1986, 12) defines the task of philosophy. 
 We might therefore argue for a return of the muse, not as a source of inspiration but 
as an object of obligation. Music is the most ubiquitous of the arts and yet, to paraphrase 
Schönberg (1974, 94) a hundred years ago, comparatively few people are able to 
understand what music has to say from a purely musical point of view. The fact that in 
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every mapping of musical knowledge to another domain it loses some essence is an 
indicator of its subversive potential. Music is a form of resistance that touches the edge of 
human materiality. The alignment of particular instances of knowledge production with the 
activity of research as understood in other domains is proper to our present circumstances. 
The knowledge achieved through practice-focussed research affords common reflection, 
analysis and re-use. It provides a mirror in which to see musical truths. By surveying the 
field of reflections as a whole, ignoring received divisions, we might see new constellations 
emerge. 
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